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Abstract: In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been increasingly 
called upon to settle disputes pertaining to migration in the Mediterranean. This article 
examines the developments in the ECtHR’s pertinent case law through the lens of vulnerability, 
a concept that offers much potential for developing the Convention in response to new 
challenges such as those posed by the so-called ‘migration crisis’. By drawing upon literature 
from law, legal theory and (bio)ethics, this article will show that while the ECtHR is amenable 
to the recognition of vulnerability in its inherent, situational and pathogenic forms, the Court’s 
actual application of the concept both belies this sophistication and squanders its potential. 
Indeed, despite widespread condemnation of the traditional, categorical conceptualisation of 
vulnerability, the ECtHR continues to rely on this simplistic and arguably invidious approach. 
As such, while the ECtHR may have extended vulnerability’s reach within its case law, it has 
nevertheless failed to recognise and effectively respond to the lived vulnerability of all who 
undertake hazardous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea, irrespective of the reason or 
reasons for their migration. 
 
Keywords: Vulnerability; migration; Mediterranean; European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR); asylum; Khlaifia. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Vulnerability is a ubiquitous yet highly contested concept. It has been characterised within 
the literature as both universal and categorical; as enduring yet situational; as variable, 
occurrent, dispositional, pathogenic, layered, and more. In recent years, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) has drawn upon the complex concept of vulnerability with 
greater frequency.1 Simultaneous to this, the ECtHR has also been called upon to adjudicate on 
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an increasing number of disputes set within the Mediterranean migration context. It was with 
the Grand Chamber’s landmark judgment in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece2 that the two 
collided. In M.S.S., the Court for the first time accepted that asylum-seekers are, by virtue of 
‘the vulnerability inherent in [their] situation’,3 ‘particularly vulnerable’,4 and therefore 
deserving of ‘special protection’ under the ECHR.5 Yet, while M.S.S. may have further 
extended vulnerability’s reach into the arena of cross-border migration, the Grand Chamber’s 
late-2016 judgment in Khlaifia and Others v Italy6 brought this extension to an abrupt halt. In 
Khlaifia, the Grand Chamber declined to recognise as vulnerable all those undertaking 
hazardous journeys across the Mediterranean, irrespective of the reasons for their migration, 
this being despite the Chamber having taken such a position in its judgment in the case fifteen 
months prior.7 For the Grand Chamber, the journey, taken alone, was simply insufficient to 
establish particular vulnerability under the ECHR. 
 
While regrettable, this outcome does not come as much of a surprise. As this article will 
show, it is the natural, if flawed, result of the Grand Chamber continuing to latch onto a 
simplistic, outdated, and arguably prejudicial, understanding of vulnerability, one which views 
individual vulnerability as contingent upon membership of an accepted vulnerable sub-
population group. The consequence of the Grand Chamber refusing to fully embrace and apply 
a dynamic, more situational conceptualisation of vulnerability is two-fold. While this approach 
has reaffirmed the particular vulnerability of asylum-seekers, it has done so at the expense of 
the recognition of the lived vulnerability that is nonetheless experienced by those migrants 
who, having crossed the Mediterranean by precarious means, do not then go on to claim asylum 
in Europe. This leaves non-asylum-seeking migrants particularly exposed, as it maintains their 
position at the very fringes of international human rights law,8 this being despite weighty 
                                                          
1 Alexandra Timmer, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights’, in Martha 
Fineman and Anna Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics 
(Routledge 2014) 111, 111. 
2 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC] App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011). 
3 ibid para 233. 
4 ibid para 232. 
5 ibid para 251. 
6 Khlaifia and Others v Italy [GC] App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 15 December 2016). 
7 Khlaifia and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 1 September 2015) para 135. 
8 Sylvie Da Lomba, ‘Vulnerability, Irregular Migrants’ Health-Related Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2014) 21(4) European Journal of Health Law 339, 342. 
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humanitarian grounds for recognising the situational vulnerability that they nonetheless 
experience on account of the journey.9 
 
This article will begin by first surveying the literature on vulnerability (section 2), drawing 
in particular upon the apparent ‘paradox’ of vulnerability as both categorical and universal,10 
as well as examining analytical approaches that seek to more closely identify, understand and 
classify types and sources of vulnerability. Second, attention will turn to the ECtHR’s 
understanding and use of the vulnerability concept both in general and in the context of the 
ongoing so-called ‘migration crisis’ (section 3). In this respect, the discussion will draw in 
particular on the emergence in M.S.S. of a two-pronged test of vulnerability tailored to the 
migration context (section 3.2). This nascent test will be considered in the light of insights 
drawn from the literature, before third, exploring its application by the Court in the Khlaifia 
judgments (section 3.3). This will involve examining and contrasting the differing 
conceptualisations of vulnerability advanced by the Chamber and the Grand Chamber, and by 
so doing, will elucidate, appraise and problematise the ECtHR’s approach(es) to and 
application of migrant vulnerability. The discussion will then conclude (section 4) with 
reflections upon the repercussions for the human rights protection of both asylum-seeking and 
non-asylum-seeking migrants, and thoughts on what this means for the ECtHR’s capacity to 
respond effectively to the ‘new challenge[s]’11 posed by increased migratory flows arriving at 
the borders of Europe by sea. 
 
The work of Beduschi, Da Lomba, Flegar, Peroni and Timmer will be drawn upon 
throughout, as each has successfully linked the concept of vulnerability with human rights 
practice by means of exploring the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. However, insights will also be 
drawn from farther afield, specifically from (bio)ethics, as scholars in this and connected 
disciplines have been grappling with these very issues for some time, and as will be shown, 
such insights can prove particularly fruitful for the study of vulnerability and the law.12 
                                                          
9 Amnesty International, Hotspot Italy: How EU’s Flagship Approach leads to Violations of Refugee and Migrant 
Rights (Amnesty International 2016) 32. 
10 Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept in European 
Human Rights Convention Law’ (2013) 11(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1056, 1058. 
11 Khlaifia [GC] (n 6) para 241. 
12 Indeed, Kenneth Kipnis, a leading vulnerability and ethics scholar, has expressly stated that work such as his, 
which is strictly concerned with the vulnerability of research subjects and not with what he terms ‘everyday 
vulnerabilities’, ‘surely has an importance extending beyond the boundaries of research ethics’. See Kenneth 
Kipnis, ‘Seven Vulnerabilities in the Pediatric Research Subject’ (2003) 24(2) Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics; and Kenneth Kipnis, ‘Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical Taxonomy’, in National 
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2. Approaching vulnerability as a concept 
 
References to vulnerability litter popular discourse, law, policy and scholarship on a broad 
range of subject matters. Yet, as a concept, it enjoys little in the way of consensus, instead 
being characterised by ambiguity and multiplicity.13 While much of the scholarly literature 
either explicitly or impliedly speaks of vulnerability as a universal characteristic of the human 
condition, within legal and policy frameworks vulnerability is often employed as a label,14 most 
commonly attributed to an individual pursuant to their ‘membership’ of a distinct sub-
population group that is categorised as ‘vulnerable’.15 As Nickel defines, a vulnerable 
population is ‘a group of persons who, in virtue of some feature they share… are deserving of 
special protections’.16 Such features may include, inter alia, a susceptibility to exploitation or 
harm, an inability to protect or safeguard one’s own interests, unequal opportunity, or a lack of 
basic rights.17 This traditional, categorical approach can be seen, for instance, in the 2013 
European Union (EU) Reception Conditions Directive,18 article 21 of which provides a non-
exhaustive list of categories of persons who are considered vulnerable. These include, inter 
alia, (unaccompanied) minors, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, victims of human 
trafficking, and persons who have been subjected to serious forms of violence.19 A similar 
reliance on the listing of vulnerable groups has been characterised by Bracken-Roche and 
others as ‘rampant’ within research ethics policies and guidelines, especially those in the health 
sciences.20 A case in point are the 2002 Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
                                                          
Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants (National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission, 2001). 
13 Sana Loue and Bebe Loff, ‘Is there a Universal Understanding of Vulnerability? Experiences with Russian and 
Romanian Trainees in Research Ethics’ (2013) 8(5) Journal of Empirical on Human Research Ethics 17, 17. 
14 Florenica Luna, ‘Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Layers not Labels’ (2009) 2(1) International Journal 
of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 121, 123. 
15 Florencia Luna and Sheryl Vanderpoel, ‘Not the Usual Suspects: Addressing Layers of Vulnerability’ (2013) 
27(6) Bioethics 325, 326. 
16 Philip Nickel, ‘Vulnerable Populations in Research’ (2006) 27(3) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 245, 245. 
17 Angela Martin, Nicolas Tavaglione and Samia Hurst, ‘Resolving the Conflict: Clarifying ‘Vulnerability’ in 
Health Care Ethics’ (2014) 24(1) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 51, 52. 
18 Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down the standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/96 (Reception Conditions Directive). 
19 ibid article 21. 
20 Dearbhail Bracken-Roche, Emily Bell, Mary Ellen Macdonald and Eric Racine, ‘The Concept of ‘Vulnerability’ 
in Research Ethics’ (2017) 15(8) Health Research Policy and Systems 8, 15. 
 5 
 
Subjects.21 The 2002 CIOMS Guidelines refer frequently to vulnerable groups or ‘classes’.22 
Particular attention is given to what Luna has termed ‘a list of usual suspects’,23 which includes 
children,24 persons with mental or behavioural disorders,25 prisoners, homeless persons and 
refugees.26 As expressed in Nickel’s definition, designation as ‘vulnerable’ is important in a 
research setting because it affords such groups special protections and services not commonly 
available to the general population.27 Indeed, in the words of Ruof, ‘vulnerability is an abstract 
concept that has concrete effects both for those labelled vulnerable and for those not’.28 The 
same is true in law. Recognition as a vulnerable person for the purpose of the EU Reception 
Conditions Directive is critical for anyone seeking to rely on its provisions because ‘[o]nly 
vulnerable persons in accordance with Article 21 may be considered to have special reception 
needs and thus benefit from the specific support provided in accordance with [the] Directive’.29 
 
For a very many scholars, categorical attributions of vulnerability are fundamentally 
flawed. Critics denounce the categorical approach for its exclusivity,30 its rigidity,31 its 
superficiality32 and its ambiguity,33 and for its reliance on a conceptual understanding of 
vulnerability that is both simplistic34 and vague.35 Levine and others put forward a particularly 
powerful critique of the flaws of the categorical vulnerability approach, and, more broadly, of 
the utility of the term ‘vulnerable’ itself.36 They raise three basic problems. First, the traditional 
understanding of vulnerability as categorical is too broad, as ‘so many categories of people are 
                                                          
21 CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (3rd edn, CIOMS 
2002). The Guidelines are prepared by CIOMS in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). 
22 ibid 64-66. Guideline 13: Research involving vulnerable persons (commentary). 
23 Florencia Luna and Sheryl Vanderpoel, ‘Not the Usual Suspects: Addressing Layers of Vulnerability’ (2013) 
27(6) Bioethics 325, 325. 
24 CIOMS (n 21) 66-69. Guideline 14: Research involving children (commentary). 
25 ibid 70-72. Guideline 15: Research involving individuals who by reason of mental or behavioural disorders are 
not capable of giving adequately informed consent (commentary). 
26 ibid 64-66. Guideline 13: Research involving vulnerable persons (commentary). 
27 Mary Ruof, ‘Vulnerability, Vulnerable Populations, and Policy’ (2004) 14(4) Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 411, 411. 
28 ibid 412. 
29 Reception Conditions Directive (n 18) article 22(3). 
30 Da Lomba (n 8) 344. 
31 Luna and Vanderpoel (n 23) 326. 
32 Bracken-Roche and others (n 20) 15-16. 
33 Kipnis (n 12) G1. 
34 Luna and Vanderpoel (n 23) 326. 
35 Debra DeBruin, ‘Looking Beyond the Limitations of “Vulnerability”: Reforming Safeguards in Research’ 
(2004) 4(3) The American Journal of Bioethics 76, 76. 
36 Carol Levine, Ruth Faden, Christine Grady, Dale Hammerschmidt, Lisa Eckenwiler and Jeremy Sugarman, 
‘The Limitations of “Vulnerability” as a Protection for Human Research Participants’ (2004) 4(3) The American 
Journal of Bioethics 44. 
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now considered vulnerable that virtually all potential human subjects are included’.37 Second, 
it is simultaneously too narrow, as exclusively emphasising group characteristics diverts 
attention away from contextual features.38 Third, it stereotypes, thereby essentialising entire 
groups through its failure to take into consideration pertinent differences that do exist between 
individuals within a particular group.39 As Aultman and others warn, to assign individuals to a 
particular group in this way can itself lead to exploitation and harm,40 as those who are labelled 
as vulnerable risk being stigmatised41 and becoming subject to ‘paternalistic protections’ that 
are ‘premised on the assumption that the vulnerable are incapable of protecting themselves’.42 
Moreover, the failure of the categorical approach to see the individual not only stereotypes and 
essentialises within recognised vulnerable groups,43 but also has the effect of obscuring and 
denying protection for those who experience harm on account of other, unrecognised, 
vulnerabilities, such as poverty.44 This therefore calls into question the reliability of the 
categorical approach in identifying vulnerability and in protecting vulnerable individuals from 
harm.45 
 
Yet, perhaps the most incising criticism comes from legal theory. The criticism advanced 
is that vulnerability cannot be viewed as categorical for it is universal. In contrast to the 
categorical approach of seeing pockets of vulnerability amongst an otherwise invulnerable 
general human population, for Fineman and for many others, vulnerability is ‘a universal, 
inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition’.46 To be human is to be vulnerable, and to 
be vulnerable is to be in ‘a state of constant possibility of harm’.47 Vulnerability cannot 
therefore be seen as something associated with only certain population groups;48 indeed, the 
very idea of human invulnerability is exposed as a fallacy.49 Yet, Fineman’s thesis, while 
                                                          
37 ibid 46. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid 47. 
40 Julie Aultman, ‘Vulnerability: Its Meaning and Value in the Context of Contemporary Bioethics’ (2014) 14(12) 
The American Journal of Bioethics 15, 16. 
41 Florencia Luna, ‘Vulnerability, an Interesting Concept for Public Health: The Case of Older Persons’ (2014) 
7(2) Public Health Ethics 180, 182. 
42 DeBruin (n 35) 77. 
43 Da Lomba (n 8) 343. 
44 Aultman (n 40) 16. 
45 Levine and others (n 36) 44. 
46 Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20(1) Yale 
Journal of Law & Feminism 1, 8.  
47 ibid 11. 
48 Timmer (n 1) 112. 
49 Martha Albertson Fineman and Anna Grear, ‘Introduction: Vulnerability as Heuristic – An Invitation to Future 
Exploration’, in Martha Fineman and Anna Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation 
for Law and Politics (Routledge 2014) 11. 
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emphasising universality, also recognises vulnerability’s particularity.50 Specifically, an 
individual’s experience of vulnerability is unique for it is influenced simultaneously by both 
one’s distinctive position ‘within a web of economic and institutional relationships’ and one’s 
access to and possession of resources.51 Still, the universal approach itself is not immune to 
criticism. While the categorical approach has been branded as exclusive, the universal approach 
has been criticised for being over-inclusive. In the most stinging critique, Levine and others 
assert that ‘[i]f everyone is vulnerable then the concept becomes too nebulous to be 
meaningful’.52 For Luna, the universal ‘existential approach’ is as dangerous as the categorical 
‘essentialist approach’ because both risk ‘naturalising’ vulnerability, in other words, ‘if 
everyone is equally and essentially vulnerable, no one is specifically vulnerable’.53 The 
universal approach has therefore been denounced for neither ‘acknowledg[ing] the special 
perils faced by some’54 nor providing an adequate explanation for why special protection is in 
practice not afforded to all.55 In this connection, Hurst argues simply that ‘[a] definition that 
includes humanity itself… cannot provide reason for special protection’.56 
 
While it has been argued that there is ‘no inherent impediment’ to reconciling the 
categorical and universal approaches at a conceptual level,57 at the practical level, this has 
proven far less straightforward.58 Within the (bio)ethics literature, scholars including Luna, and 
Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds, have turned to analytical approaches in an effort to bring 
greater nuance to the theory of vulnerability,59 and to thereby operationalise it as a ‘conceptual 
tool’.60 Such analyses seek to focus more precisely on identifying characteristics that can render 
individuals vulnerable, in other words, its sources,61 and assessing their impact.62 Such 
characteristics, or ‘vulnerability markers’,63 include not only personal characteristics of the 
                                                          
50 Fineman (n 46) 10. 
51 ibid. 
52 Levine and others (n 36) 46. 
53 Luna (n 41) 182 (emphasis in original). 
54 DeBruin (n 35) 76. 
55 Martin and others (n 17) 52. 
56 Samia Hurst, ‘Vulnerability in Research and Health Care; Describing the Elephant in the Room?’ (2008) 22(4) 
Bioethics 191, 192 (emphasis in original). 
57 Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1060; Da Lomba (n 8) 349. 
58 Wendy Rogers, Catriona Mackenzie and Susan Dodds, ‘Introduction’ (2012) 5(2) International Journal of 
Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 1, 2. 
59 Wendy Rogers, Catriona Mackenzie and Susan Dodds, ‘Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability’ 
(2012) 5(2) International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 11, 26. 
60 Luna (n 14) 123. 
61 Margaret Meek Lange, Wendy Rogers and Susan Dodds, ‘Vulnerability in Research Ethics: A Way Forward’ 
(2013) 27(6) Bioethics 333, 335. 
62 Rogers and others (n 59) 16; DeBruin (n 35) 77. 
63 Meek Lange and others (n 61) 334. 
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individual, but also the nature of one’s social, legal, political and economic environment,64 
which, when taken together, help emphasise both vulnerability’s relationality65 and 
mutability.66 
 
Of particular utility in the context of migration at sea is the vulnerability taxonomy 
proposed by Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds.67 Their approach seeks to identify and classify 
sources of vulnerability and associated duties that exist towards those recognised as 
vulnerable.68 The taxonomy is formed of three overlapping kinds of vulnerability. These are 
inherent, situational, and pathogenic vulnerability,69 all of which, as will be shown, are present 
in a migration at sea setting. The first, inherent vulnerability, echoes Fineman’s thesis. It is 
concerned with vulnerabilities that ‘arise from our corporeality, our neediness, our dependence 
on others, and our affective and social natures’, in other words, vulnerabilities inherent in the 
human condition.70 The second, situational sources, are context-specific. They are ‘caused or 
exacerbated by the personal, social, political, economic, or environmental situation of a person 
or social group’.71 Such sources may exist either in the short or long term, and may occur either 
once or on multiple, separate occasions.72 The third, pathogenic sources, emanate from 
‘dysfunctional social or personal relationships’,73 in other words, from relationships 
characterised by, inter alia, prejudice, abuse, persecution or injustice.74 Pathogenic 
vulnerabilities may also occur when well-intended protection policies either exacerbate 
existing vulnerabilities75 or generate new vulnerabilities.76 Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds then 
take their taxonomy one stage further by arguing that these three sources of vulnerability can 
be experienced in one of two states – either dispositionally or occurrently.77 To take being at 
sea as an example.78 All human beings are dispositionally vulnerable at sea, yet most of us will 
                                                          
64 Franck Duvell, Anna Triandafyllidou and Bastian Vollmer, ‘Ethical Issues in Irregular Migration Research in 
Europe’ (2010) 16(1) Population, Space and Place 227, 232. 
65 Luna (n 14) 129; Meek Lange and others (n 61) 335. 
66 DeBruin (n 35) 77. 
67 Rogers and others (n 59) 24. 
68 Meek Lange and others (n 61) 336 and 340. 
69 Rogers and others (n 59) 24. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 Meek Lange and others (n 61) 336. 
74 ibid. 
75 Rogers and others (n 59) 25. 
76 Meek Lange and others (n 61) 336. 
77 Margaret Meek Lange, ‘Vulnerability as a Concept for Health Systems Research’ (2014) 14(2) Ethical Review 
of Health Services Research 41, 42. 
78 Rogers and others (n 59) give the example of hunger. On page 24, they explain that while all ‘[a]ll human beings 
are dispositionally vulnerable to hunger… most of those of us who live in affluent countries are not occurrently 
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never find ourselves in a situation in which we are occurrently vulnerable at sea. Even when at 
sea, the vast majority of us will benefit from the safety provided by being on an appropriate 
seagoing craft. This is in stark contrast to those who find themselves in ill-equipped, 
overcrowded crafts that are unsuited to making long journeys across large expanses of water. 
 
In sum, analytical approaches to vulnerability are useful as they not only assist in better 
integrating the universal and context-specific interpretations of vulnerability,79 but also provide 
a way to better direct attention towards what Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds have called ‘more 
than ordinary vulnerability’.80 However, it must be borne in mind that although taxonomies 
may help to provide more ‘concrete’ guidance, such guidance can only ever be seen as 
‘general’.81 While the taxonomy can be utilised as a framework through which to view 
vulnerability in its many manifestations, the theory does not, and cannot, provide all of the 
answers, especially when it comes to determining where the threshold lies between ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘more than ordinary’ vulnerability. The decision as to where this threshold lies, and 
therefore the decision as to who should be owed ‘special protection’ on account of their 
vulnerability, rests with the decision-makers. Turning therefore to now look specifically at the 
ECtHR, the vulnerability taxonomy of Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds will be used to examine 
the manner in which the concept of vulnerability has been employed by the Court as a tool to 
determine who should be owed ‘special protection’ under the ECHR, first, in general, and 
second, in respect to migration specifically. 
 
3. Examining migrant vulnerability at the ECtHR 
 
3.1. Unpacking the ECtHR’s general approach to vulnerability 
 
While the term ‘vulnerable’ has been a feature of the ECtHR’s lexicon for decades,82 the 
Court has been engaging far more frequently with the concept in recent years.83 Signalling 
                                                          
vulnerable to life-threatening hunger on a daily basis, unlike a significant proportion of the world’s population 
who lack the resources to supply their daily nutritional needs’. 
79 Rogers and others (n 58) 3-4. 
80 Rogers and others (n 59) 24. 
81 Meek Lange and others (n 61) 337. 
82 See multiple references to vulnerability in Dudgeon v UK App no 7525/76 (ECtHR, 22 October 1981). 
83 Veronika Flegar, ‘Vulnerability and the Principle of Non-Refoulement in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2016) 8(2) Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 148, 153. 
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perhaps an at least implicit appreciation of the universality of human vulnerability,84 the Court 
has often used a range of preceding qualifying terms directly prior to the term ‘vulnerable’. 
These have included ‘specially’,85 ‘highly’,86 ‘extremely’87 and ‘particularly’,88 with the latter 
being especially common.89 It nevertheless remains somewhat unclear as to when and why an 
applicant will be deemed ‘particularly vulnerable’ in the eyes of the Court,90 this being in no 
small part due to the Court having provided neither a precise definition nor a coherent set of 
vulnerability ‘criteria’.91 Scholarly analyses have though given some insight into how the 
concept is understood by the Court. 
 
Analysing Timmer’s thematisation of the Court’s use of the term vulnerable92 through the 
lens of the vulnerability taxonomy of Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds reveals that the Court 
recognises inherent vulnerabilities, in particular, of children and persons with mental 
disabilities, as well as situational sources of vulnerability, for instance, being in detention or in 
a domestic violence setting.93 Moreover, Timmer identifies in the Court’s jurisprudence what 
she calls ‘compounded vulnerability’.94 On such occasions, the Court recognises an applicant 
as being vulnerable on multiple grounds, or to use the language of Luna, presenting with 
multiple layers, which may be both inherent and situational. For example, in V.C. v Italy,95 in 
finding that the applicant was in a situation of ‘particular vulnerability’,96 the Court considered 
both the applicant’s inherent vulnerability as a 15-year-old minor97 and ‘the particular situation 
of vulnerability, both moral and physical’ in which she found herself.98 Timmer further 
observes that in some such cases ‘compounded vulnerability’ may result in a seemingly more 
                                                          
84 On this point, Peroni and Timmer report that a Strasbourg judge confirmed as much, stating that ‘All applicants 
are vulnerable, but some are more vulnerable than others’. See Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1060.  
85 Dudgeon (n 82) para 62. 
86 Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania [GC] App no 47848/08 (ECtHR, 17 
July 2014) para 104. 
87 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR, 12 October 2006) para 55. 
88 Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria App no 25446/06 (ECtHR, 24 April 2012) para 130. 
89 It is, however, important to note that, while in the vast majority of cases the Court has used a preceding 
qualifying term such as ‘particular’, its use of such terms is not entirely consistent. For example, in Kiyutin (n 
112), while the Court unequivocally asserts in paragraph 74 that the applicant, as a person with HIV, ‘belonged 
to a particularly vulnerable group’, earlier, in paragraph 64, the Court simply refers to persons living with HIV as 
‘a vulnerable group’. 
90 Flegar (n 83) 157. 
91 Da Lomba (n 8) 343. 
92 Timmer (n 1) 112. 
93 ibid 114-118. 
94 ibid 118. 
95 App no 54227/14 (ECtHR, 1 February 2018). 
96 ibid para 110. 
97 ibid para 89. 
98 ibid para 110. 
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pronounced vulnerability, which has been termed by the Court as ‘extreme’, ‘double’ or 
‘great’.99 This was notably the case in the Court’s judgment in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki 
Mitunga v Belgium.100 In Mubilanzila Mayeka, the Court found that a five-year-old, 
unaccompanied, irregular migrant was ‘in an extremely vulnerable situation’,101 and that there 
had been a consequent violation of Article 3 on account of her detention for two months in an 
adult detention facility.102 
 
However, although in judgments such as V.C. the Court has approached the question of 
vulnerability in the light of the specific circumstances of the applicant, Timmer, both 
individually and in her work with Peroni, has emphasised the Court’s particular reliance upon 
‘vulnerable groups’,103 or in other words, the categorical approach, in its vulnerability 
reasoning. This is especially the case in judgments concerning minority rights and 
discrimination. In its landmark judgment in Chapman v UK,104 the Court, despite finding no 
violations of any of the Convention articles raised,105 explicitly accepted ‘the vulnerable 
position of Gypsies as a minority’.106 Since Chapman, the ECtHR has recognised the 
vulnerability of other sub-population groups, including, as already mentioned, children107 and 
persons with mental disabilities,108 as well as, in Kiyutin v Russia,109 persons living with 
HIV.110 In Kiyutin, the ECtHR gave some indication as to the rationale behind its vulnerable 
groups approach, explaining that ‘such groups were historically subject to prejudice with 
lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion’.111 Similarly, in Alajos Kiss v 
Hungary,112 the Court stated that ‘particularly vulnerable group[s] in society… have suffered 
considerable discrimination in the past’.113 While these statements are of course insightful, they 
cannot be taken as ultimately determinative of which groups will or will not be considered 
vulnerable by the ECtHR because not all groups whose vulnerability has been recognised by 
                                                          
99 Timmer (n 1) 118. 
100 Mubilanzila Mayeka (n 87). 
101 ibid paras 55 and 103. 
102 ibid paras 50 and 59. 
103 Timmer (n 1) 111; Peroni and Timmer (n 10) 1056. 
104 [GC] App no 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001). 
105 ibid paras 116, 120, 125 and 130. 
106 ibid para 96. 
107 Okkali v Turkey App no 52067/99 (ECtHR, 17 October 2006) para 70. 
108 Renolde v France App no 5608/05 (ECtHR, 16 October 2008) para 84. 
109 App no 2700/10 (ECtHR, 10 March 2011). 
110 ibid para 64. 
111 ibid para 63. 
112 App no 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010). 
113 ibid para 42. 
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the Court fit within this particular reasoning, for instance, children. Indeed, in respect to 
children, Timmer pinpoints the Court’s references to dependency on others and an inability to 
complain about abuse as both being sources of their ‘inherent and constant’ vulnerability.114 
 
Identification by the ECtHR as vulnerable is highly important because such recognition can 
have substantial implications in respect to the level of protection afforded by the Convention. 
As Beduschi observes, although the ECtHR does not create new obligations per se, it does 
utilise vulnerability ‘as a magnifying glass, exposing a greater duty to protect and care imposed 
upon States’.115 For example, in Alajos Kiss, the Court stated that ‘if a restriction on 
fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society… then the State’s 
margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the 
restrictions in question’.116 In Chapman, the Court found there to be a positive obligation on 
contracting states ‘to facilitate the Gypsy way of life’,117 and in Valiulienė v Lithuania,118 the 
Court stated that ‘given the particular vulnerability of women affected by domestic violence, a 
heightened degree of vigilance was required by the State’.119 
 
It is clear therefore that recognition as vulnerable under the Convention has important 
consequences for the level of protection afforded to certain applicants and for the obligations 
incumbent upon contracting states. It is also apparent that the Court has, in extending the 
vulnerability concept to a broader range of applicants, relied heavily, albeit not exclusively, on 
a categorical approach that attaches vulnerability to certain groups.120 In the light of these 
general findings, this discussion now turns to examine precisely how the concept of 
vulnerability has been deployed by the ECtHR in respect to the Mediterranean migration 
context, chiefly with discussion of the Court’s judgments in the cases of M.S.S. and Khlaifia. 
 
3.2. M.S.S. – a nascent test of vulnerability in the Mediterranean migration context 
 
                                                          
114 Timmer (n 1) 114. 
115 Ana Beduschi, ‘Vulnerability on Trial: Protection of Migrant Children’s Rights in the Jurisprudence of 
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116 Alajos Kiss (n 112) para 42. 
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118 App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013). 
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It was in M.S.S. that the ECtHR for the first time identified asylum-seekers as ‘a particularly 
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection’.121 M.S.S. 
concerned the treatment of an Afghan male national who, having first entered the EU via 
Greece, travelled on to Belgium, only to then be transferred back to Greece upon attempting to 
seek asylum in Belgium.122 The applicant claimed, inter alia, that his detention at Athens 
International Airport and his subsequent living conditions in Greece amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.123 In respect to his living conditions, the applicant alleged that he had for 
months been residing in a ‘state of extreme poverty’.124 In its judgment, the Court attached 
‘considerable importance’ to the fact that the applicant had sought asylum.125 Specifically, in 
coming to its finding of a violation of article 3, the Grand Chamber stated that ‘the applicant’s 
distress was accentuated by the vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asylum-seeker’.126 
 
The M.S.S. judgment has been well-received in many quarters.127 As Peroni has said, ‘the 
line of reasoning put forward by the majority… opens up the idea of vulnerability to other 
circumstances and other groups’.128 Never before had the ECtHR so emphatically supported 
the rights of asylum-seekers in general, and ‘[n]ever before… had living conditions of extreme 
poverty been found to give rise to state responsibility under Article 3’.129 In order to achieve 
these advances, the Court relied substantially upon a bespoke test of vulnerability tailored to 
the forced migration context. The Court identified two sources, or prongs, of the applicant’s 
vulnerability as an asylum-seeker. The first was ‘everything he had been through during his 
migration’ (migratory experience), and the second was ‘the traumatic experiences he was likely 
to have endured previously’ (prior trauma).130 The Court left undefined what it meant precisely 
by ‘everything he had been through during his migration’ and ‘traumatic experiences’, 
however, these are surely open to broad interpretation in the light of the blanket manner with 
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which the Court attributed these to all asylum-seekers. ‘[E]verything’ that an asylum-seeker 
has ‘been through during [their] migration’ may surely encompass not only reception 
conditions and characteristics of the receiving state’s asylum system, but also all that was 
experienced during the actual journey itself. For instance, the cramped and unsanitary 
conditions experienced on an overcrowded seagoing craft, a lack of privacy and basic supplies, 
the sense of precarity and uncertainty associated with a long and dangerous journey by sea, and 
acute exposure to the elements, especially at night.131 
 
Viewing these two sources through the lens of the vulnerability taxonomy of Rogers, 
Mackenzie and Dodds, it becomes apparent that this is a heavily situational test. Both sources 
primarily stem not from the inherent nature of the applicant but from the situation in which the 
applicant found himself. The test is open to temporary forms of vulnerability and is flexible 
enough to recognise pathogenic sources as a sub-type of this situational vulnerability. Such 
pathogenic sources could here include the prejudice, injustice and persecution that the applicant 
likely experienced, as well as the exacerbation of his situational vulnerability on account of the 
Greek authorities’ failure to act. However, while the sources of vulnerability here are strongly 
situational, and while the Court in M.S.S. did, on the whole, conduct an individualised 
assessment of the applicant’s situation, it is nevertheless clear that the manner in which the 
Court applied vulnerability to the applicant was unmistakeably categorical. This was as a 
consequence of the Court affiliating the two-pronged test with the ‘status’ of the applicant as 
an asylum-seeker.132 Moreover, by recognising vulnerability as ‘inherent in his situation as an 
asylum-seeker’,133 the Court sweepingly attributed particular vulnerability to all asylum-
seekers ‘as though it were an inherent attribute of the entire class’.134 This thus brings to the 
fore the concerns advanced in the literature in respect to essentialism, paternalism and 
stigmatisation, and also raises questions about the reliability of the test in recognising 
vulnerability, more on which will be discussed below. 
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It is indeed clear that the M.S.S. judgment has been highly influential. It is also apparent 
that this nascent vulnerability test has gained significant traction. The Court has on numerous 
occasions since reaffirmed its position that asylum-seekers constitute a ‘particularly… 
vulnerable population group in need of special protection’, this being on account of the two 
grounds listed in M.S.S.135 In fact, in Mahamed Jama v Malta,136 the Court clarified this further 
by announcing that the particular vulnerability of asylum-seekers is ‘a state of vulnerability 
which exists irrespective of other health concerns or age factors’.137 However, the precise form 
and reach of the test has remained somewhat undefined. Indeed, while in many of the 
subsequent cases the applicants have, at the material time, been seeking asylum and awaiting 
a decision on their claim, this was not, however, the case in Khlaifia. 
 
3.3. Khlaifia – vulnerability on account of the journey (alone)? 
 
3.3.1. Conflicting judgments 
 
In Khlaifia, the Court was called upon to adjudicate on the receiving and holding (to be 
read as ‘detaining’) of three Tunisian non-asylum-seeking migrants (the applicants) by Italian 
authorities, first, at the Early Reception and Aid Centre (CSPA) at Contrada Imbriacola on the 
island of Lampedusa,138 and second, on ships moored in Palermo harbour, Sicily,139 as well as 
the subsequent return (to be read as ‘expulsion’) of the applicants to Tunisia in accordance with 
‘simplified procedures’ bilaterally entered into by the two states.140 The applicants, all males 
aged in their twenties, had each been travelling on board rudimentary vessels across the 
Mediterranean when they were intercepted by the Italian coastguard.141 After spending a few 
days on Lampedusa, the applicants were flown to Palermo.142 They remained in Palermo, again 
for only a few days,143 before being returned to Tunis.144 
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In both of the judgments in the case, that is, in the judgment of the Chamber and in the 
judgment of the Grand Chamber, vulnerability performed a brief but crucial role.145 As in 
M.S.S., in Khlaifia, the question of vulnerability was raised in relation to an alleged violation 
of article 3,146 here specifically, the detention conditions at the CSPA.147 The applicants 
complained of overcrowding, poor sleeping arrangements, and unacceptable conditions of 
hygiene and sanitation.148 For the Chamber, the evidence before it revealed standards that had 
fallen short of the requirements prescribed by article 3.149 However, before either the Chamber 
or the Grand Chamber came to a finding as to whether or not there had been a violation of 
article 3, both considered the duration of the applicants’ detention. It was indeed uncontested 
that the applicants had been held at the CSPA for a period of just two to three days.150 Both the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber accepted that the short duration of the applicants’ detention 
meant that ‘their limited contact with the outside world could not therefore have had serious 
consequences for their personal situations’.151 The Grand Chamber also distinguished the case 
from those previous cases in which it had found violations of article 3 ‘in spite of the short 
duration of the deprivation of liberty in question’,152 doing so on the grounds that, in those 
cases, the conditions of detention had been particularly poor, even ‘atrocious’.153 The 
applicants nevertheless stressed the following: 
 
…that at the material time they had just survived a dangerous crossing of the 
Mediterranean by night in a rubber dinghy, and that this had weakened them physically and 
psychologically. They had thus been in a situation of vulnerability, accentuated by the fact that 
their deprivation of liberty had no legal basis, and their mental distress had increased as a 
result.154 
 
The applicants were here drawing on both situational and pathogenic sources of 
vulnerability, remarking in particular on how the actions of the Italian authorities had 
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, their ‘situation of vulnerability’. The Chamber agreed. The 
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applicants were vulnerable. Moreover, in the Chamber’s view, there had been a violation of 
article 3.155 For the Chamber, it was a ‘fact that the applicants… were in a situation of 
vulnerability’.156 In line with the argument put forward by the applicants, the Chamber found 
that this ‘situation of vulnerability’ was on account of their having ‘just undergone a dangerous 
journey on the high seas’.157 Having accepted that the applicants had been in a vulnerable 
situation, the Chamber then conducted what was essentially a balancing exercise between the 
short duration on one side and the applicants’ vulnerability on the other.158 It found that the 
short duration of the applicants’ stay in the CSPA was outweighed by their vulnerability. As 
such, ‘[t]heir confinement in conditions which impaired their human dignity thus constituted 
degrading treatment in breach of Article 3’.159 For the Grand Chamber, however, no such 
balancing exercise was required. The applicants were not vulnerable and there was no violation 
of article 3.160 While the Grand Chamber recognised that ‘the applicants were weakened 
physically and psychologically because they had just made a dangerous crossing of the 
Mediterranean’,161 it nevertheless qualified this by emphasising that the applicants had not 
sought asylum during the ‘not insignificant period’ they had been in Italy.162 As the applicants 
were not asylum-seekers, they consequently ‘did not have the specific vulnerability inherent in 
that status’.163 The Grand Chamber thereby concluded that neither the treatment of the 
detainees nor the conditions of their detention at the CSPA violated article 3.164 
 
3.3.2. Conflicting conceptualisations 
 
It is clear from both Khlaifia judgments that the journey is relevant, per the first prong of 
the M.S.S. test (migratory experience). Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber appreciated 
that the applicants had undergone, and had been detrimentally affected by, a ‘dangerous’ 
migratory journey. The difference between the two judgments, however, lies in whether the 
journey alone is sufficient to establish vulnerability under the ECHR. For the Chamber, the 
applicants’ vulnerability had a single source, the journey, the danger of which was enough to 
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render them vulnerable and to provide sufficient weight to in effect lower the minimum 
threshold needed to find a violation of article 3. Moreover, timing is crucial, as it cannot be 
assumed that such vulnerability is permanent. In the Chamber’s view, the applicants were 
vulnerable at the material time, meaning that their detention, which was effective almost 
immediately upon their arrival on Lampedusa, occurred at a time when they were ‘Convention 
vulnerable’. 
 
The conceptualisation of vulnerability proffered by the Chamber was, without doubt, 
progressive, at least within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. For the majority in the Chamber, 
neither the legal status nor the political identity of the applicants was of issue when it came to 
the question of vulnerability. By taking this approach, the Chamber was able to release the 
M.S.S. two-pronged test from any restrictions that had been placed upon it as a consequence of 
it having been attached to the status of an asylum-seeker. Yet, the Grand Chamber, and indeed 
the minority in the Chamber,165 elected to stick resolutely to a purely categorical application of 
the test. That the applicants failed to fall within any of the sub-population groups previously 
identified as vulnerable under the ECHR was fatal to their claim. Not only were the applicants 
not asylum-seekers,166 they also ‘belonged neither to the category of elderly persons nor to that 
of minors… did not claim to be suffering from any particular medical condition. Nor did they 
complain of any lack of medical care’.167 In the words of Judge Raimondi, the applicants, who 
were aged in their mid-twenties,168 were of ‘young age and good health’.169 The Grand 
Chamber thereby reverted to its most traditional, categorical approach, thus belying the nuance 
and conceptual sophistication that underpins the two-pronged M.S.S. test. While the Grand 
Chamber may have again reaffirmed the inherent and particular vulnerability of asylum-
seekers, it has done so in a manner that unequivocally excludes non-asylum-seeking migrants 
from the Convention’s ‘special protection’. 
 
At least for now, the Grand Chamber has squandered the opportunity to move towards a 
more nuanced, mutable conceptualisation of vulnerability that better responds to the lived 
experience of all those making the hazardous journey across the Mediterranean, whatever the 
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reason or reasons for their journey. Yet, in addition to this, the Grand Chamber’s Khlaifia 
judgment has also had an important impact on the scope of the M.S.S. test, an impact that 
seemingly narrows and thereby restricts the test in two particular, overlapping ways. 
 
First, it appears to amend the second prong (prior trauma). As mentioned, both prongs of 
the M.S.S. test were left open to broad interpretation. Yet, while the express wording in M.S.S. 
was ‘because of… the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously’,170 in 
Khlaifia, the Court made explicit reference to the fact that the applicants ‘did not claim to have 
endured traumatic experiences in their country of origin’.171 While it can be argued that this 
requirement that the trauma be endured in the ‘country of origin’ was always implicit in the 
test, this being because the test was detailed in the express light of an asylum-seeking migrant, 
it is nevertheless the case that this qualification did not explicitly feature in the initial test. The 
effect of this ‘clarification’ is to narrow the possible interpretation of the second prong, framing 
it more unequivocally as a test that applies only to those seeking asylum. 
 
Second, it hints towards an imbalance in the test. On the face of it, the Grand Chamber’s 
Khlaifia judgment appears to lend further support to the M.S.S. vulnerability test as a two-
pronged test. Both prongs were explicitly considered in the judgment, and while it was 
acknowledged that the applicants had undertaken a ‘dangerous journey’, the fact that they had 
‘not claim[ed] to have endured traumatic experiences’172 was fatal to their claim. As such, and 
in accordance with the test being two-pronged, non-fulfilment of the second prong (prior 
trauma) meant that the test had not been met and the applicants were not ‘particularly 
vulnerable’ under the ECHR. However, what the Khlaifia Grand Chamber judgment also helps 
reveal is an apparent prioritisation of the second M.S.S. prong (prior trauma) over the first 
(migratory experience). As mentioned, in M.S.S., the Grand Chamber tied the two-prong test 
to what it pronounced as the ‘inherent’ vulnerability of asylum-seekers. The Grand Chamber 
therefore effectively declared that all asylum-seekers automatically satisfy the two prongs, and 
that therefore all asylum-seekers are vulnerable as a result of the journey and as a result of prior 
traumatic experiences. Yet, to take each prong in turn, while the second (prior trauma) is indeed 
likely to be typical, albeit not unique, to the situation of asylum-seekers, the first (migratory 
experience) is by no means exclusive to those seeking asylum, as is made apparent by the facts 
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in Khlaifia. Additionally, by no means can it automatically be assumed that an individual who 
is seeking asylum has undergone a ‘dangerous’ journey in order to seek asylum – indeed, this 
does not form a pre-requisite for the recognition of refugee status. As such, although the 
applicant in M.S.S. did satisfy both prongs of the test, it seems perfectly plausible that a 
situation may arise in which an asylum-seeker may not necessarily meet the first prong of the 
test, that is vulnerability on account of the journey, but would nevertheless be recognised as 
vulnerable under the ECHR due to the Grand Chamber’s position that all asylum-seekers are 
to be ‘unconditionally’173 recognised as such. Yet, conversely, as shown by Khlaifia, meeting 
the first prong (migratory journey) but not the second (prior trauma) fails to establish particular 
vulnerability. It could of course be argued that the first prong is simply so open-ended, per the 
use of the word ‘everything’, that it would always be met by all asylum-seekers regardless of 
the precise nature of their journey, remembering of course that the journey is only one aspect 
to be taken into consideration in this respect. Yet, even if this is the case, an imbalance would 
still occur because while the first prong (migratory journey) would be open to a broad 
interpretation, the second (prior trauma) would be so narrowly interpreted as to in effect restrict 
it to asylum-seekers only. 
 
This imbalance, along with the clarification of the first prong, provides further evidence of 
the Court latching onto a traditional understanding of vulnerability. Despite the Grand Chamber 
itself having identified vulnerability in the Mediterranean migration context as two-pronged, 
the second, prior traumatic experience, now specifically in the country of origin, appears to be 
prioritised over the first, everything that is experienced during migration, including the journey. 
 
In sum, the Grand Chamber’s approach to vulnerability in the Mediterranean migration 
context is categorical par excellence. While the ECtHR may to some degree appreciate the 
universality of human vulnerability, while it does typically engage in an individualised 
assessment of an applicant’s claims, and while it may, at least impliedly, recognise a diverse 
range of vulnerability’s sources, including in its situational and pathogenic forms, the way in 
which the concept is applied by the Court in this particular context nevertheless relies on the 
attribution of vulnerability to an individual based upon their membership of a recognised 
vulnerable sub-population group. The consequence for the ECtHR is an unduly rigid, 
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essentialising conceptualisation of vulnerability that is ill-equipped to respond effectively to 
the reality of increased mixed-migratory flows arriving at the borders of Europe by sea. The 
consequence for non-asylum-seeking migrants who have crossed the Mediterranean into 
Europe is that while the physical and psychological toll of their journey is to be noted by the 
Court, their resulting vulnerability remains unrecognised. 
 
Yet, there is one final and somewhat curious aspect to the Grand Chamber’s unwillingness 
to recognise the vulnerability of non-asylum-seeking migrants crossing the Mediterranean. It 
is clear from surveying the Court’s judgments post-M.S.S. that just because asylum-seekers are 
now recognised as particularly vulnerable by the Court does not mean that a violation of the 
Convention will automatically follow. This aligns with the position pre-M.S.S in respect to 
some other vulnerable groups, for instance, as in Chapman mentioned above.174 For example, 
in Mahamed Jama, although the applicant was seeking asylum in Malta at the time, and so 
therefore automatically met the two-pronged M.S.S. test of ‘particular vulnerability’,175 the 
Court found no violation of Article 3.176 This was because, in its view, even having taken into 
consideration the applicant’s particular vulnerability as an asylum-seeker, ‘the cumulative 
effect of the conditions complained of… did not amount to degrading treatment’.177 Moreover, 
and perhaps most intriguingly, the Court then went on to say that it ‘[did] not lose sight of the 
fact that the applicant… was not more vulnerable than any other adult asylum-seeker detained 
at the time’.178 While the Court offered no further clarification at this point, more is revealed 
by looking to the subsequent case of Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta.179 As in 
Mahamed Jama, Abdullahi Elmi concerned irregular entry into Malta by boat.180 Although 
there are numerous similarities between the two cases, there is, however, one crucial difference. 
While the applicant in Mahamed Jama was an adult,181 the applicants in Abdullah Elmi were 
minors, aged sixteen and seventeen.182 In Abdullahi Elmi, the Court reiterated the particular 
vulnerability of the applicants as asylum-seekers,183 exactly as it had done in Mahamed Jama, 
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but then went on to emphasise that the applicants were indeed minors. In the view of the Court, 
the applicants ‘were even more vulnerable than any other adult asylum-seeker detained at the 
time because of their age’.184 It was at this point that Mahamed Jama was cited, a contrario.185 
This is most interesting given that it was actually in its judgment in Mahamed Jama that the 
Court stated that the particular vulnerability of asylum-seekers ‘exists irrespective of… age 
factors’.186 While it may indeed be the case that age does not impact the Court’s recognition of 
asylum-seekers’ particular vulnerability, it nonetheless appears that age was here pivotal to 
whether a violation was found.187 The same also seems to have been the case in Tarakhel v 
Switzerland.188 Although in this case the six minors, aged between 2 and 15,189 were 
accompanied by their parents (the applicants), the Grand Chamber nevertheless affirmed their 
‘extreme vulnerability’ as asylum-seeking children,190 before then reaching the conclusion that 
there would be a related violation of article 3 should the family be returned to Italy without the 
necessary guarantees in place.191 
 
It appears therefore that something more is needed to find a violation. Being one asylum-
seeker amongst many is simply not enough. An applicant needs that certain something that, 
when combined with their ‘inherent’ and ‘particular’ vulnerability,192 means they stand out 
from the ‘asylum-seeking crowd’. Based on the post-M.S.S. case law, this certain something 
may very well be age, especially being a minor, although particularly poor living conditions 
may also suffice. Indeed, looking to M.S.S. itself, it was crucial that the applicant, who was not 
a minor, was residing in a state of the ‘most extreme poverty’.193 This is of course an 
exceedingly high bar to meet. It was to some degree nevertheless affirmed in Tarakhel, where 
although the ECtHR had ‘serious doubts’ about the capacity of the asylum reception system in 
Italy, it did not find the arrangements in Italy sufficiently deficient to ‘act as a bar to all 
removals of asylum seekers to that country’.194 What was though absolutely pivotal in Tarakhel 
was that the applicants had six children. It would therefore be reasonable to speculate that even 
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if the applicants in Khlaifia had been asylum-seekers, they would likely still not have been 
successful in their claim under article 3, on account of their age, the short duration of their 
detention, and the Grand Chamber’s view that their detention conditions could be distinguished 
from the more severe conditions found in earlier cases. With the work of Beduschi and Timmer 
in mind, it seems therefore that for the ECtHR to find a violation in such cases requires some 
form of compounded vulnerability. Moreover, it appears that the compound must include the 
presence of at least one recognised vulnerable sub-population group, meaning that the Court is 
once again relying on a heavily traditional conceptualisation of vulnerability as categorical. 
While being an asylum-seeker would suffice for this purpose, when it comes to non-asylum-
seeking migrants, specifically irregular migrants, it seems that only in situations of the most 
‘extreme’ vulnerability involving children would the vulnerability of the applicant act as ‘the 
decisive factor… tak[ing] precedence over considerations relating to… status as an illegal 
immigrant’.195 
 
This finding that the recognition of particular vulnerability does not lead to an automatic 
violation of the Convention raises the broader question of why the Court has been so reluctant 
to accept the seemingly self-evident vulnerability of non-asylum-seeking migrants arriving at 
Europe’s southern shores. To provide a satisfactory answer to this question would likely require 
further empirical exploration, but what is clear is that for the Court to approach the question of 
vulnerability through the lens of the now asylum-seeker-specific M.S.S. test would be to present 
non-asylum-seeking migrants with a fait accompli. The Court would not, as Peroni had hoped, 
be opening up the concept of vulnerability to embrace ‘other circumstances and other 
groups’,196 but would instead be utilising the vulnerability concept as a tool for exclusion. 
 
4. Conclusion – Behind the times or a sign of the times? 
 
The ECtHR’s judgments in the cases of M.S.S. and Khlaifia have proven to be of immense 
significance not only for the rights protections of asylum-seeking and non-asylum-seeking 
migrants risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean, but also for the development, or lack 
thereof, of the Court’s understanding and use of the concept of vulnerability. While through 
these judgments the Court has engaged with differing conceptualisations of vulnerability, and 
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for a brief period appeared to be moving towards a more nuanced and dynamic form of 
situational vulnerability, the ECtHR has ultimately stuck steadfastly to the much-maligned 
traditional approach of attributing individual vulnerability on the basis of vulnerable sub-
population group membership. For those migrants who have made the perilous journey across 
the Mediterranean, but ‘who fall within the groups of undocumented migrants or rejected 
asylum-seekers rather than within the vulnerable group of asylum-seekers’, the Court has now 
made clear its position that they are not to be considered vulnerable as a group.197 It appears 
that only in the most extreme examples of compounded vulnerability will irregular migrants be 
recognised as vulnerable under the ECHR, and the likelihood is that those recognised as such 
will be minors. As has here been shown, such a position is lamentable. Rather than utilising 
the concept of vulnerability as a means by which to move towards a human rights law that is 
‘more inclusive… [and] more responsive to the needs of vulnerable people’,198 whatever their 
legal or political status, the concept has instead been used to further exclude those who are 
already some of the most marginalised by society and the law. 
 
Looking to other fields, it seems that change is being embraced. Within the medical 
sciences, the latest edition of the CIOMS Guidelines, published in 2016,199 exhibit a 
demonstrable semantic shift away from the traditional language of group-based vulnerability 
towards explicit recognition of individual vulnerability.200 Although the Guidelines do not 
reflect a complete conceptual split from the traditional approach,201 they do nonetheless 
emphasise ‘the importance of avoiding classification of entire groups as inherently 
vulnerable’.202 The UNHCR’s 2016 Vulnerability Screening Tool203 also takes a strikingly 
similar approach. While the Tool does mention many of those groups commonly considered to 
be vulnerable, it also recognises the vulnerability of those who do not fit within the established 
categories, stating that ‘their individual circumstances and context are the main determinates 
of vulnerability’.204 This is indeed in stark contrast to the ‘mere affiliation’ approach that 
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characterises categorical conceptualisations of vulnerability.205 Moreover, the Tool warns 
against ‘a rigid or exhaustive measurement of vulnerability’,206 advocating instead for ‘a 
person-centred and holistic approach’.207 Such change is, however, yet to be seen in the ECtHR, 
and the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Khlaifia does very little to take any such steps towards 
this needed conceptual shift. 
 
It would, of course, be unhelpful to downplay the challenges that southern European states 
face as a result of ongoing influxes of migrants at their borders. The Grand Chamber indeed 
recognised as much in its Khlaifia judgment when it stated that ‘the undeniable difficulties and 
inconveniences endured by the applicants stemmed to a significant extent from the situation of 
extreme difficulty confronting the Italian authorities at the relevant time’.208 But for the 
Convention to be able to respond effectively to new challenges, it must adapt and evolve in 
line with the changing global socio-political climate. Moreover, the Court must remain vigilant 
and must continue to re-assert, perhaps now more than ever, that the responsibility for 
protecting the most vulnerable, whomever they may be, rests with the contracting states. 
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